Nicomachean Ethics

Nicomachean Ethics

Bk. III

Actions And Responsibility

Voluntary (Willing/Intended) vs. Involuntary (Unwilling/Contrary to Intention)

"Actions... receive praise or blame when they are voluntary, but pardon, sometimes even pity, when they are involuntary."

Involuntary (Unwilling/Contrary to Intention):

When (a) by Force or (b) by Ignorance

"What comes about by force or because of ignorance seems to be involuntary. What is forced has an external origin, the sort of origin in which the agent or victim contributes nothing – if, e.g., a wind or human beings who control him were to carry him off."

[ Note: 'force' here does NOT mean 'force of circumstance', e.g. 'she made me do it'. All such actions would be voluntary on Aristotle's account. The most difficult voluntary actions, however, are those that are 'mixed' -- see below.]

'Mixed' Actions

"Suppose, e.g. a tyrant tells you to do something shameful, when he has control over your parents and children, and if you do it, they will live, but if not, they will die."

"...throwing cargo overboard in storms; for no one willingly throws cargo overboard, unconditionally, but anyone with any sense throws it overboard <under some conditions> to save himself and the others." (p. 785)

[ Such actions are said to be done both willingly ("I did it to save my family"; "I did it to save the ship") and unwilling ("I didn't want to rob the bank"; "I didn't want to throw the cargo overboard"). Hence, Aristotle refers to them as 'mixed' actions. ]

'Mixed' Actions are Voluntary

"But they would seem to be more like voluntary actions. For at the time they are done they are choiceworthy, and the goal of an action reflects the occasion; hence also we should call the action voluntary or involuntary with reference to the time when he does it." (p. 785)

"Now in fact he does it willingly; for in these sorts of actions he has within himself the origin of the movement of the limbs that are the instruments <of the action>, and when the origin of the actions is in him, it is also up to him to do them or not to do them." (p. 785)

'Mixed' Actions can be Praised, Blamed or Pardoned

"For such <mixed> actions people are sometimes actually praised, whenever they endure something shameful or painful as the price of great and fine results; and if they do the reverse, they are blamed, since it is a base person who endures what is most shameful for nothing fine or for only some moderately fine result."

"In some cases there is no praise, but there is pardon, whenever someone does a wrong action because of conditions of a sort that overstrain human nature, and that no one would endure."

Some 'Mixed' Actions Cannot Be Pardoned (e.g. Matricide)

'But presumably there are some things we cannot be compelled to do, and rather than do them we should suffer the most terrible consequences and accept death; for the things that <alledgeldy compelled Euipedes' Alcmaeon to kill his mother appear ridiculous."

Actions that are Involuntary because they are forced

"Perhaps we should say that something is forced unconditionally whenever its cause is external and the agent contributes nothing."

"But suppose someone says that pleasant things and fine things force us, since they are outside us and compel us. It follows that for him everything is forced, since everyone in every actions aims at something fine or pleasant."

"It is ridiculous, then, for <our opponent> to ascribe responsibility to external <causes> and not to himself, when he is easily snared by such things; and ridiculous to take responsibility for fine actions himself, but to hold pleasant things responsible for his shameful actions."

Actions that are Involuntary because they are Caused By Ignorance

"Everything caused by ignorance is non-voluntary, but what is involuntary [unwilling/contrary to intention] also causes pain and regret. For if someone's action was caused by ignorance, but he now has no objection to the action, he has done it neither willingly, since he did not know what it was, nor unwillingly, since he now feels no pain. Hence, among those who act because of ignorance, the agent who now regrets his action seems to be unwilling, while the agent with no regrets may be called non-willing, since he is another case – for since he is different it is better if he has his own special name."

Caused by Ignorance vs. Done in Ignorance (e.g. Drunkenness, Extreme Emotion)

"actions caused by ignorance would seem to be different from action done in ignorance. For if the agent is drunk or angry, his action seems to be caused by drunkenness or anger, not by ignorance, though it is done in ignorance, not in knowledge." (p. 786)

Actions Done in Ignorance (e.g. Drunkenness, Extreme Emotion) are Voluntary

"<This ignorance does not make an action involuntary.>"

"legislators also impose corrective treatments for the ignorance itself, if the person seems to be responsible for the ignorance. A drunk, e.g., pays a double penalty; for the origin is in him, since he controls whether gets drunk, and his getting drunk is responsible for his ignorance."

Vicious Actions are Done in Ignorance also, hence are Voluntary also

"Certainly every vicious person is ignorant of the actions he must do or avoid, and this sort of error makes people unjust, and in general bad. But talk of involuntary action is not meant to apply to <this> ignorance of what is beneficial." (p. 787)

"For the cause of involuntary action is not <this> ignorance in the decision, which causes vice; it is not <in other words> ignorance of the universal, since that is a cause of blame. Rather, the cause is ignorance of the particulars which the action consists in and is concerned with; for these allow both pity and pardon, since an agent acts involuntarily if he is ignorant of one of these particulars." (p. 30)

[ Consider the following kinds of ignorance:

(a) Ignorance of Universal (e.g. It is wrong to steal)

(b) Ignorance of Particular (e.g. This is Jason's cup)

Aristotle's argument is that, in the case of the vicious agent, his ignorance is the kind that makes his action voluntary, i.e. he is responsible for it -- it is ignorance of the universal. But in the case of the virtuous agent, his ignorance is the kind that makes his action involuntary, i.e. he is not responsible for it -- it is ignorance of the particular.

However, Aristotle uses the expression: "done in ignorance" for the responsible action, and "caused by ignorance" for the non-responsible action.

All actions done in ignorance are voluntary/willing/intended. This is because the vicious agent does indeed intend e.g. to steal Jason's cup. He steals willingly.

All actions caused by ignorance are involuntary. This is because the virtuous agent does not intend e.g. to steal Jason's cup. (He thinks it's his own cup.) He steals unwillingly.]

Actions that are Involuntary are so because they are Caused by Ignorance of Particulars

"Presumably, then, it is not a bad idea to define these particulars, and say what they are, and how many. They are:

(1) who is doing it;

(2) what he is doing;

(3) about what or to what he is doing it;

(4) sometimes also what he is doing it with, e.g. the instrument;

(5) for what result, e.g. safety;

(6) in what way, e.g. gently or hard/."

[ Explained: ]

(1) "he could hardly be ignorant of himself"

(2) "he might be ignorant of what he is doing, as when someone says that <the secret> slipped out while he was speaking, or, as Aeschylus said about the mysteries, that he did not know it was forbidden to reveal it; or, like the person with the catapult, that he let it go when he <only> wanted to demonstrate it"

(3) "he might think that his son is an enemy, as Merope did"

(4) "he might think... that the barbed spear has a button on it, or that the stone is a pumice-stone"

(5) "By giving someone a drink to save his life we might kill him"

(6) "wanting to touch someone, as they do in sparring, we might wound him"

"Hence someone who was ignorant of one of these seems to have done an action unwillingly, especially when he was ignorant of the most important of them; these seem to be (2) what he is doing, and (5) the result for which he does it."

"Hence it is action called involuntary with reference to this sort of ignorance < that we meant when we said> the agent must, in addition, feel pain and regret for his action."

Actions Caused by Appetite or Emotion are not Involuntary/Unwilling/Contrary to Intention

"on this view [that actions caused, etc.] none of the other animals will ever act voluntarily; nor will children. <But clearly they do.>" (p. 787)

"among all the actions caused by appetite or emotion do we do none of them voluntarily? Or do we do the fine actions voluntarily and the shameful involuntarily? Surely <the second answer> is ridiculous when one and the same thing <i.e. appetite or emotion> causes <both fine and shameful actions>."

"what is involuntary seems to be painful, whereas what expresses our appetite seems to be pleasant."

Actions caused by Appetite or Emotion are Voluntary

"Moreoever, how are errors that express emotion any less voluntary than those that express rational calculation? For both sorts of errors are to be avoided; and since non-rational feelings seem to be no less human <than rational calculation>, actions resulting from emotion or appetite are also proper to a human being; it is absurd, then, to regard them as involuntary."

Summary

INVOLUNTARY

(a) Caused by force -- e.g. "Wind pushed me into you, I wouldn't have done it otherwise" -- not really action of mine -- no responsibility -- no praise or blame

(b) Caused by ignorance (of particulars) -- e.g. "I didn't know it was you, I wouldn't have done it otherwise" -- not my fault -- no praise or blame

Here: We are excused from responsibility

VOLUNTARY

(a) Done in Ignorance # 1 -- e.g. drunk or excessive emotion -- responsibility of agent -- I made myself get drunk -- blame

(b) Done in Ignorance # 2 -- e.g. vice -- responsibility of agent -- blame

(c) 'Mixed' -- e.g. "I did it to save my family!" -- responsibility of agent -- praise or blame or pardon, depending on circumstances

Here: we are not excused from responsibility; but in some cases of 'mixed' actions, we are pardoned, because we claim extenuating circumstances -- we seek to justify the action

Voluntary Actions vs. Deliberate Actions (i.e. actions that express decision/choice)

"actions we do on the spur of the moment are said to be voluntary, but not to express decision"

Decision is not Appetite, Emotion, Wish or Belief

(1) Not Appetite:

"decision is not shared with nonrational <animals>, but appetite... [is] shared with them"

"incontinent person acts on appetite, not on decision, but the continent person does the reverse and acts on decision, not on appetite"

"appetite is contrary to decision, but not to appetite"

"appetite's concern is what is pleasant and what is painful, but neither of these is the concern of decision" (p. 788)

(2) Not Emotion:

"decision is not shared with nonrational <animals>, but... emotion [is] shared with them"

"actions caused by emotion seem least of all to express decision" (p. 788)

(3) Not Wish:

"we do not decide to do what is impossible... but we do wish for what is impossible, e.g. never to die, as well <as for what is possible>." (p. 788)

Further, we wish <not only for results we can achieve>, but also for results that are <possible, but> not achievable through our own agency, e.g. victory for some actor or athlete. But what we decide to do is never anything of that sort, but what we think would come about through our own agency." (p. 788)

"Again, we wish for the end more <than for what promotes it>, but we decide to do what promotes the end. We wish, e.g. to be healthy, but decide to do what will make us healthy; and we wish to be happy, and say so, but could not appropriately say we decide to be happy, since in general what we decide to do would seem to be what is up to us." (p. 789)

(4) Not Belief:

"belief seems to be about everything, no less about what is eternal and what is impossible <for us> than about what is up to us."

"beliefs are divided into true and false, not into good and bad, but decisions are divided into good and bad more than into true and false."

"it is our decisions to what is good or bad, not our beliefs, that make the characters we have."

"we decide to take or avoid something good or bad. We believe what it is, whom it benefits or how; but we do not exactly believe to take or avoid."

"decision is praised more for deciding on what is right, whereas belief is praised for believing rightly."

"we decide on something <even> when we know most completely that it is good; but <what> we believe <is> what we do not quite know."

"those who make the best decisions do not seem to be the same as those with the best beliefs; on the contrary, some seem to have better beliefs, but to make the wrong choice because of vice."

[ Decisions are about (a) what one believes is possible, and (b) what is within one's power to do; they are not the same as wishes. They may go against appetite and emotion. Decisions are good or bad, and are not the same as beliefs. We are praised or blamed for our decisions.]

Decision

"what is decided is the result of prior deliberation. For decision involves reason and thought" (p. 789)

Deliberation

"No one deliberates about eternal things, e.g. about the universe, or about the incommensurability of the sides and the diagonal; nor about things that are in movement but always come about the same way, either from necessity or by nature or by some other cause... For none of these results could be achieved through our agency."

"We deliberate about what is up to us, i.e. about the actions we can do; and this is what is left <besides the previous cases>. For causes seem to include nature, necessity and fortune, but besides them mind and everything <operating> through human agency."

"However, we do not deliberate about all human affairs; no Spartan, e.g., deliberates about how the Scythians might have the best political system. Rather, each group of human beings deliberates about the actions they can do." (p. 790)

"there is no deliberation about the sciences that are exact and self-sufficient, e.g. about letters, since we are in no doubt about how to write them <in spelling a word>. Rather, we deliberate about what results through our agency, but in different ways on different occasions, e.g. about questions of medicine and money-making"

"Deliberation concerns what is usually <one way rather than another>, where the outcome is unclear and the right way to act is undefined. And we enlist partners in deliberation on large issues when we distrust our own ability to discern <the right answer>." (p. 790)

[We deliberate about what is possible and within our power, when it is possible to go one way or another. We don't deliberate about what is inevitable, or in place of others, or about what happens unpredictably. Also, we don't deliberate when there is a well-known standard way of proceeding. Finally, we don't deliberate in areas where there is only possible way, e.g. exact sciences, such as mathematics.]

Deliberation is about how to promote ends, not ends themselves

"We deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends; a doctor, e.g., does not deliberate about whether he will cure, or an orator about whether he will persuade, or a politician about whether he will produce good order, or any other <expert> about the end <that his science aims at>." (p. 790)

"Rather, we first lay down the end, and then examine the ways and means to achieve it. If it appears that any of several <possible> means will reach it, we consider which of them will reach it most easily and most finely; and if only one <possible> means reaches it, we consider how that means will reach it, and how the means itself is reached, until we come to the first cause, the last thing to be discovered." (p. 790-1)

[Deliberation is carried out with some end that is wished for; the wished-for end must be first, in order to deliberate about how to achieve end. Achieving an end may be a matter of deciding on a means (e.g. I wish to visit NYC; should I drive or fly?), or deciding to do something that is constitutive of realizing that end (e.g. I wish to help him; will I give him advice or just listen attentively?) There can be no deliberation without some wish to guide deliberation.

Difference between 'choice' understood as deliberation, and 'choice' understood as mere picking -- i.e. arbitrarily, or "random choice", which is not really choice !]

If pursuit of end requires impossible step, then we abandon end

"If we encounter an impossible step – e.g. we need money but cannot raise it – we desist; but if the action appears possible, we undertake it."

"What is possible is what we could achieve through our agency <including what our friends could achieve for us>; for what our friends achieve is, in a way, achieved through our agency, since the origin is in us. <In crafts> we sometimes look for instruments, sometimes <for the way> to use them; so also in other cases we sometimes look for the means to the end, sometimes for the proper use of the means or for the means to that proper use."

"a human being would seem to originate action; deliberation is about the actions he can do; and actions are for the sake of other things; hence we deliberate about what promotes an end, not about the end." (p. 791)

Deliberation vs. Decision

"What we deliberate about is the same thing as what we decide to do, except that by the time we decide to do it, it is definite; for what we decide to do is what we have judged <to be right> as a result of deliberation."

"what we decide to do is whatever action among those up to us we deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is up to us; for when we have judged <that it is right> as a result of deliberation, our desire to do it expresses our wish."

What decision is about

"the sort of thing decision is about; it is about what promotes the end" (p. 791)

Wish is the for the End

"Wish, we have said, is for the end." (p. 792)

Actual good vs. Apparent good?

"the good is what is wished"

(but "what someone wishes if he chooses incorrectly is not wished at all")

vs.

"the apparent good is wished"

(but "nothing is wished by nature" and "contrary things will be wished")

"unconditionally and in reality, what is wished is the good, but to each person what is wished is the apparent good?"

"To the excellent person, then, what is wished will be what is wished in reality, while to the base person what is wished is whatever it turns out to be <that appears good to him>." (p. 792)

"For the excellent person judges each sort of thing correctly, and in each case what is true appears to him. For each state <of character> has its own special <view of> what is fine and pleasant, and presumably the excellent person is far superior because he sees what is true in each case, being a sort of standard and measure of what is fine and pleasant." (p. 792)

"In the many, however, pleasure would seem to cause deception, since it appears good when it is not; at any rate, they choose what is pleasant because they assume it is good, and avoid pain because they assume it is evil." (p. 792)

"we have found, then, that we wish for the end, and deliberate and decide about what promotes it; hence the actions concerned with what promotes the end will express a decision and will be voluntary. Now the activities of the virtues are concerned with <what promotes the end>; hence virtue is also up to us, and so is vice." (p. 792)

"For when acting is up to us, so is not acting, and when No is up to us, so is Yes. Hence if acting, when it is fine, is up to us, then not acting, when it is shameful, is also up to us; and if not acting, when it is fine, is up to us, then acting, when it is shameful, is also up to us. Hence if doing, and likewise not doing, fine or shameful actions is up to us; and if, as we saw <doing or not doing them> is <what it is> to be a good or bad person; then it follows that being decent or base is up to us." (p. 792)

Is anyone willingly bad?

"The claim that no one is willingly bad or unwillingly blessed would seem to be partly true but partly false. For while certainly no one is unwillingly blessed, vice is voluntary. If it is not, we must dispute the conclusion just reached, that a human being originates and fathers his own actions as he fathers his children. But if our conclusion appears true, and we cannot refer <actions> back to other origins beyond those in ourselves, then it follows that whatever has its origin in us is itself up to us and voluntary."

"legislators... impose corrective treatments and penalties on anyone who does vicious actions, unless his action is forced or is caused by ignorance that he is not responsible for; and they honor anyone who does fine actions; they assume that they will encourage the one and restrain the other. But no one encourages us to do anything that is not up to us and voluntary; people assume it is pointless to persuade us not to get hot or distressed or hungry or anything else of that sort, since persuasion will not stop it happening to us."

"They also impose corrective treatment on someone who <does a vicious action> in ignorance of some provision of law that he is required to know and that is not hard <to know>. And they impose it in other cases likewise for any other ignorance that seems to be caused by the agent's inattention; they assume it is up to him not to be ignorant, since he controls whether he pays attention." (p. 793)

"But presumably his character makes him inattentive. Still, he is himself responsible for having this character, by living carelessly, and similarly for being unjust by cheating, or being intemperate by passing his time in drinking and the like; for each type of activity produces the corresponding character. This is clear from those who train for any contest or action, since they continually practice the appropriate activities. <Only> a totally insensible person would not know that each type of activity is the source of the corresponding state; hence if someone does what he knows will make him unjust, he is willingly unjust." (p. 793)

"the person who is <now> unjust or intemperate was originally free not to acquire this character, so that he has it willingly, though once he has acquired the character, he is no longer free not to have it <now>." (p. 794)

Objection

"But someone may say, 'Everyone aims at the apparent good, and does not control how it appears; on the contrary, his character controls how the end appears to him.' (p. 794)

"First, then, if each person is in some way responsible for his own state <of character>, then he is also himself in some way responsible for how <the end> appears." (p. 794)

"Now the virtues, as we say, are voluntary, since in fact we are ourselves in a way jointly responsible for our states of character, and by having the sort of character we have we lay down the sort of end we do. Hence the vices will also be voluntary, since the same is true of them." (p. 795)

"Certain actions produce [virtues], and they cause us to do these same actions, expressing the virtues themselves, in the way that correct reason prescribes. They are up to us and voluntary." (p. 795)

"Actions and states, however, are not voluntary in the same way. For we are in control of actions from the origin to the end, when we know the particulars. With states, however, we are in control of the origin, but do not know, any more than with sickness, what the cumulative effect of particular actions will be; none the less, since it was up to us to exercise a capacity either this way or another way, states are voluntary." (p. 795)