Lecture 1

The Principle of Charity

From the writings of the American philosopher Donald Davidson (1917-2003).

"In Davidson's work this principle, which admits of various formulations and cannot be rendered in any completely precise form, often appears in terms of the injunction to optimise agreement between ourselves and those we interpret, that is, it counsels us to interpret speakers as holding true beliefs (true by our lights at least) wherever it is plausible to do" [italics added]

(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/)

See Davidon's 'Radical Interpretation’ [1973] reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).

In the case of interpreting philosophers, and especially philosophers of antiquity in translation, to apply the principle of charity to them is to attempt to find an interpretation of the philosopher such that what the philosopher says is true, or is possibly true. This principle does not, of course, require that you find an interpretation, no matter how implausible, such that what the philosopher says is true. But it does require that you select, amongst the plausible interpretations, the one that makes what the philosopher says come out to be true, or possibly true.

Say that a philosopher says that "All things are full of gods". Say that one plausible interpretation of this statement is that (a) there is a deity in everything. Say that another plausible interpretation is that (b) everything is alive. Even if (b) happens to be false, nevertheless it is less counterintuitive, and stands a greater chance of being true, than (a). Or at least, assume that we think this way about (a) and (b). If we do, then we ought to choose interpretation (b). What this example demonstrates is that, even when we apply the principle of charity, it may still be the case that what the philosopher says comes out to be false. Interpreting a philosopher charitably does not entail that she or he will be correct about anything.

Principle of Occam's Razor (or Ockham's Razor)

From the writings of the Mediaeval scholastic philosopher William of Ockham (or William of Occam) (1285-1347/49). Also known as the law of parsimony or the law of economy.

"Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate", i.e. “Plurality should not be posited without necessity.” However, the principle is normally expressed as "Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity".

However, what Ockham wrote was: "For nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is self-evident, or known by experience or proved by the authority of Scared Scripture."

This principle says that, of competing explanations, choose the simplest explanation, because the simplest explanation is most likely to be the correct one. In particular, if the same thing (whatever it is) can be equally well explained either by (a) appealing to one thing (or one type of thing), or (b) appealing to two things (or two types of things), then always choose (a).

Say that a person's illness can be equally well explained by (a) a detailed description of the person's body, or (b) a detailed description of the person's body AND the fact that another person gave the person "the evil eye". If the two explanations are equally explanatory (they explain absolutely everything about the person's illness), then choose explanation (a).

This principle is used in science as well as philosophy. In science the idea is that nature never does with more what it can do with less. So if you are explaining something, you should explain as much as possible by making as few assumptions as possible.
 

Monistic Materialism (or Material Monism)

(a) Monism. The term "monism" comes from the Greek monos, meaning only, alone, single. A monist is a philosopher who believes that reality is one. This may be understood as the claim that only one thing exists, or that everything that exists belongs is of one kind. Monism is opposed to Dualism (from Latin, dualis, meaning two), according to which reality is two, and Pluralism (from Latin pluralis, meaning more), according to which reality is many.

This definition of monism, of course, allows for a plurality of monisms. There are many different ways to be a monist. For example, one may be a monistic idealist, and believe that reality is just one mind and its various thoughts, or many minds (all of which are one kind of thing: mind) with their various thoughts. (On this view, matter does not exist).

(b) Materialism. This is the position that (a) everything that is exists is matter, or that (b) matter does exist. On the former account, if you are a materialist then you believe that nothing other than matter exists. But on the latter account, you may hold that, in addition to matter, immaterial things (e.g. souls, angels, gods, ghosts) exist also. A dualist, for example, believes that material things exist and immaterial things exist.

A monistic materialist (or material monist), then, is a philosopher who holds that everything that exists is matter. Or, there is nothing other than matter, which is of one kind. This one kind of matter may be in motion or not, it may have various properties or not, and it may be finite or infinite. Furthermore, this one kind of matter may assume different forms.

Panpsychism

All matter thinks. (Rocks, tires, clouds, etc., think.) (This does not necessarily mean that all matter is conscious, and it does not mean that all matter is self-conscious).