Problems with Primary Qualities and Bodies

On the basis of the conclusion that all qualities are ideas, Berkeley moves to the conclusion that it is impossible for primary qualities to be "in" bodies.

(1) Primary qualities, such as extension, figure, motion (or rest), are ideas.

(2) Ideas cannot inhere in, or exist in, a non-thinking (or non-perceiving) substance.

(3) A material substance is a non-thinking (or non-perceiving) substance.

---> Primary qualities, such as extension, figure, motion (or rest), cannot inhere in, or exist in, a material substance.

Berkeley also rejects the argument that ideas resemble bodies, or qualities in/of bodies, as follows:

Ideas can only resemble ideas.

---> Ideas cannot resemble bodies, or qualities of bodies, unless bodies, or qualities of bodies, are ideas.

Berkeley also rejects the argument that primary qualities of bodies can cause ideas:

(1) Primary qualities, such as extension, figure, motion (or rest), are ideas.

(2) Ideas are inert or passive.

(3) So, ideas cannot cause anything.

(4) So, primary qualities cannot cause anything.

---> Primary qualities, such as such as extension, figure, motion (or rest), cannot cause ideas.