Meditation III

God Cannot Be A Deceiver

Having gone to such great lengths in Meditation III to (attempt to) establish that God exists, which was the first thing that Descartes needed to establish in order to undermine the Product of Chance Argument from Meditation I, Descartes next (attempts to) establish that God cannot be a deceiver. He does this, however, in a single paragraph at the end of Meditation III:

"God... a being having all those perfections that I cannot comprehend... and a being subject to no defects whatever... cannot be a deceiver, for it is manifest by the light of nature that all fraud and deception depend on some defect."

(CSM II: 35)

His argument may be put briefly as follows:

(1) God has all perfections and no imperfections.

(2) Deception is an imperfection.

—> God cannot a deceiver.

Descartes does not expand upon what he means when he says that deception is an imperfection. One way of understanding this is to say that an imperfection is nothing real, but is the absence of something real, namely, a perfection. Deception is an imperfection, so deception is the lack of a perfection -- the perfection of goodness, it seems. Perfections are qualities, whereas imperfections are the lack of qualities. Deception, then, is the lack of a quality -- the quality of goodness. More formally:

(1) A perfection is a quality.

(2) An imperfection is the lack of a quality.

(3) Goodness is a perfection.

(4) So, goodness is a quality.

(5) Deception is an imperfection.

(6) So, deception is the lack of a quality.

(7) Deception is the lack of the quality of goodness.

(8) God has all perfections.

(9) So, God has all qualities.

(10) God has no imperfections.

(11) So, God lacks no qualities.

(12) God has the quality of goodness.

---> God cannot deceive.

This argument may be contested, on the grounds that an imperfection may be a quality, as opposed to the lack of a quality.

Even if it is granted that an imperfection is the lack of a quality, however, the soundness of the argument relies upon the truth of premise (5). It requires that we accept that deception is an imperfection. That may be contested. Perhaps deception is not an imperfection.

In Meditation IV, Descartes amplifies somewhat the argument that God is not a deceiver:

"it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attest to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God."

(CSM II: 37)

Descartes says that the will to deceive "attests to maliciousness or weakness". Hence, if a person has a will to deceive then she is either weak or malicious (or both). Weakness and malice, however, are imperfections. God, a being that has all perfections and no imperfections, cannot be weak, and cannot be malicious. Hence God cannot have the will to deceive.

For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we will leave to one side the claim that a will to deceive attests to "weakness" (although we will return to this claim below). Descartes's argument appears to be as follows:

(1) The will to deceive is malicious.

(2) Malice is an imperfection.

(3) God has all perfections.

(4) God has no imperfections.

(5) So, God cannot be malicious.

---> God cannot have the will to deceive.

While it may be possible to reject premise (2), it is difficult to do so. "Malice" may be a synonym for evil or wickedness; it appears to mean ill-will, hatred -- to (simply) desire to harm. It is surely an imperfection to be malicious. God is surely not malicious (assuming that ethical categories are to apply to God at all, which will be assumed for the sake of the argument).

This leaves premise (1), which is much more controversial. Hence, premise (1) will be examined.

Is it true that the will to deceive "attests to maliciousness or weakness"? Is it true that if a person has a will to deceive she is malicious? May a person have a will to deceive even if she is not malicious? Is it possible to be a non-malicious deceiver?

Consider the following two objections:

(a) A person may have the will to deceive without being malicious.

(b) A person may have the will to deceive (without being malicious and) while being beneficent.

The first says that a person may have the will to deceive another but not be motivated by malice. The motive may one of many motives, and may be good or bad -- for example, the motive of self-interest.

The second says that a person may have the will to deceive another and be motivated by beneficence. Beneficence is a good motive.

In the second set of Objections to the Meditations, Mersenne made the objection that it is possible for people (doctors, fathers) to deceive other people (patients and children, respectively) from the motive of beneficence. That is, it is possible to deceive without malice. In particular, it is possible to deceive with beneficence. Therefore, it is possible for God to deceive without malice. In particular, it is possible for God to deceive from the motive of beneficence:

"Fourthly, you say that God cannot deceive. Yet there are some schoolmen who say he can. [...] Cannot God treat men as a doctor treats the sick, or a father his children?  In both these cases there is frequent deception though it is always employed beneficially and with wisdom."

(CSM II: 90)

Hobbes made a similar argument against Descartes in his fifth set of Objections to the Meditations:

"The standard view is that doctors are not at fault if they deceive their patients for their health's sake, and that fathers are not at fault if they deceive their children for their own good. For the crime of deception consists not in the falsity of what is said but in the harm done by the deceiver. M. Descartes should thus consider the proposition 'God can in no case deceive us' and see whether it is universally true."

(CSM II: 136)

Hobbes's claim appears to be that deception is only wrong (or malicious) insofar as it is harmful to the deceived. Beneficent deception, since it benefits the deceived rather than harms him/her, is not wrong (or malicious). (Hobbes may be making explicit what is implicit in Mersenne's objection).

Note that Hobbes's position may or may not be counter-intuitive. It may not be counter-intuitive to hold that deception is permissible (or even, perhaps, obligatory) in those cases where it benefits the deceived. Hence, it may not be counter-intuitive to hold that in these cases, deception is not wrong (overall), because the benefit outweighs the harm of the deception, and so, in the end, there is no net harm. This would be to grant that there is some amount of harm involved in deception, and to hold that deception is prima facie wrong, that is, defeasibly wrong (i.e., is wrong unless it is outweighed by something good, in which case, it is not wrong, and may be done, without regret).

However, it may be counter-intuitive to hold that there is no harm involved in deception, just as there is no harm involved in brushing one's hair, and that deception is permissible (or obligatory) or wrong entirely on the basis of whether any harm is produced by deception. This is to hold that deception is morally neutral, i.e., neither right nor wrong.

In his response to Mersenne in the second set of Replies, Descartes appears to reject the possibility that there are any schoolmen who agree that God lies or deceives:

"Fourthly, in saying that God does not lie, and is not a deceiver, I think I am in agreement with all metaphysicians and theologians past and future. It is very clear from this that my remarks in the Meditations were concerned not with the verbal expression of lies, but only with malice in the formal sense, the internal malice which is involved in deception."

(CSM II, p. 101-102)

However, there is one claim that Descartes makes here that is peculiar:

"Nevertheless, I would not want to criticize those who allow that through the mouths of the prophets God can produce verbal untruths which, like the lies of doctors who deceive their patients in order to cure them, are free of any malicious intent to deceive."

(CSM II: 102)

So long as this is read as Descartes saying that he doesn't want to criticize theologians who say that God can "produce verbal untruths" through "the mouths of the prophets" that are "free of any malicious intent to deceive", then this claim may be fine.

However, if this is read as Descartes saying that doctors who "in order to cure" their patients do "deceive their patients" but "are free of any malicious intent to deceive", and that "God can produce verbal untruths", which are deceptions, but which "are free of any malicious intent to deceive", then this claim is problematic. For this is to say that there can be non-malicious intent to deceive, and that God can intend to deceive without malice. This to reject premise (1) in the argument above, and hence reject the conclusion.

In his reply to Hobbes, Descartes says that God cannot have an intention to deceive:

"All that I require is that we are not deceived in cases where our going wrong would suggest an intention to deceive on the part of God; for it is self-contradictory that God should have such an intention."

(CSM II: 136-7)

Descartes consistently says that God cannot be malicious. With the exception of what he says to Mersenne, he says that an intent to deceive is necessarily malicious. In what he says to Mersenne, however, he seems to allow that an intent to deceive may not be malicious.

If we accept the claim that God cannot be malicious, the question remains as to why God cannot have an intent to deceive, if it is possible to have a non-malicious intent to deceive, and in particular, to have a beneficent intent to deceive.

I contend that Descartes holds the position that an intent to deceive is necessarily malicious. This is how I read his claim about "the internal malice which is involved in deception". Hence, his argument is that God cannot deceive, because God cannot be malicious, and deception is necessarily malicious. What he says to Mersenne is simply a slip. This argument, which I consider to be the stronger argument, may be put (briefly) as follows:

Stronger Argument

 

(1) Necessarily, the will to deceive is malicious.

(2) Necessarily, God is not malicious.

 --> Necessarily, God lacks the will to deceive.

Descartes's position here is defensible, if one construes 'malice' as a knowing failure to respect rational agency (as opposed to a knowing intention to harm). This is the position held by Kant. To intend to deceive another person is to knowingly fail to treat that other person as a rational agent. To intend to deceive another person is to knowingly fail to respect that other person's autonomous rational nature. The wrongness of intending to deceive another person is the wrongness of knowingly failing to respect that other person as a person. Knowingly failing to respect a person as a person is necessarily wrong.

According to this position, the wrongness of intending to deceive another person is not the wrongness of intending to harm another person. (It is possible to knowingly fail to respect another person as a person and to benefit her/him). The wrongness is of a different kind. It is like the wrongness of treating an adult as a child, or of treating a human being as an animal. Even if the person were to be benefited by such treatment, the treatment would remain wrongful. It would remain a knowing failure to treat the person as a person. It would remain a knowing treatment of a person as a non-person. It would remain a knowing treatment of a person as a thing. It is always wrong to knowingly treat a person as a thing, even if the person is benefited by her/his treatment as a thing.

One further aspect of this position is that it does not countenance 'weighing' intending to deceive against intending something else (for example, violence). That is, it does not countenance 'weighing' wrongness against something else (for example, goodness, or more wrongness). It is an assumption of this position that it is never the case that one must 'choose between two evils'. To say that intending to deceive is necessarily malicious is to say that one should never intend to deceive. Hence, the position is not that intending to deceive (being malicious) is pro tanto wrong (i.e., is always wrong, but nevertheless, may be done, with regret, since it is a lesser wrong than another wrong). Rather, the position is that intending to deceive (being malicious) is wrong sans phrase.

However, it is possible for Descartes to hold a different position. It is possible for him to hold the position that God never deceives, not because deception is necessarily malicious, but because deception by God is necessarily malicious. That is, while deception by people is sometimes non-malicious, deception by God is always malicious.

This position, it seems, is adopted by Plato in the Republic. Plato distinguishes between "true falsehood" and "falsehood in words". While men and gods both hate "true falsehood", men do not hate all "falsehood in words". Gods, however, do hate all "falsehood in words", also. Here is what is said:

- And the thing that is really a falsehood is hated not only by the gods but by human beings as well.

(Plato, Republic, Bk. II 382b-382e; trans. G. M. A Grube and C. D. C. Reeve)

Plato's argument, it seems, is that, as contrasted with human beings, "there is no reason" for a god to deceive anyone -- other than, presumably, to deceive that person. Gods are all-powerful, and do not have enemies, and gods are all-knowing, and do not have to make anything up. Gods never need to use the means of deception in order to achieve their ends. Therefore, if a god ever deceived someone, it would be (simply) in order to deceive that person. However, to deceive someone (simply) in order to deceive that person is evil. Gods are all-good, however, and hence, are never evil. Hence, gods never deceive someone (simply) in order to deceive that person. Hence, gods never deceive anyone.

For example, if the Nazis are at your door, asking you if there are Jewish children in your house, and if you are a god (and hence, love Jewish children, and hence, want to protect them), then, with a mere thought, you can, for example, teleport the children to somewhere else, and/or change the Nazis's beliefs and feelings, so that they also love Jewish children, and want to help you to protect them. (You can also, of course, teleport the Nazis into outer space, or send them back in time to the dinosaurs, but that might not be very god-like). As a god, you have no need to deceive the Nazis in order to protect the Jewish children. As a god, you have no need to deceive the Nazis in order to do anything -- except, that is, to (simply) deceive them. Hence, if you deceived the Nazis, you would only be deceiving them to order to (simply) deceive them. But this you would never do, because this is evil. Deceiving the Nazis in order to (simply) deceive the Nazis is malicious.

To this it might be countered that, even for a god, there are certain ends that necessarily require deception as a means. This would not matter if all of those ends were evil ends. However, if there are certain good ends that, even for a god, necessarily require deception as a means, then this would be a problem for the argument. It would mean that it is false that there is no reason for a god to ever deceive anyone. For example, it might be argued that, even for a god, the good end of having the Nazis understand the evil of deception necessarily requires that the Nazis be deceived.

The best response to such an objection is to argue that it has the result that nothing is such that a god may not do it, in order to achieve some good end. Murder, torture, rape, etc., might be necessary means for certain good ends, even for a god. Hence, a god may have to murder, torture, rape, etc. Since this result is highly counter-intuitive, the response must be either that it is false that there are any ends that necessarily require deception as a means, even for a god (or false that there are any good ends that necessarily require deception as a means, even for a god), or that all good ends that necessarily require deception as a means are such that the evil of the means of deception -- as with the evil of the means of murder, torture, rape, etc. -- outweighs the good of the good ends. Both responses are defensible. Here, the former response will be given.

The argument that it is false that there are any ends that necessarily require deception as a means, even for a god (or false that there are any good ends that necessarily require deception as a means, even for a god), is best made as follows: for a god, there is no such thing as a 'necessary means' to an end. For a god, a means is never necessary in order to achieve an end. For a god, any end can be achieved, without a means. Hence, if a god ever intends to deceive, it is because the god has deception itself as an end, or because a god chooses deception as a means to the end when the god does not have to do so (since a god never has to use a means to an end). However, to have deception itself as an end, or to use deception as a means to an end when it is unnecessary, is malicious. Since a god cannot be malicious, a god cannot have an intention to deceive.

Descartes does say that the will to deceive attests to "weakness''. Hence, he may be said to hold that God's power is such that He never needs to use deception in order to achieve any end. This argument for the conclusion that "God... cannot be a deceiver", which I consider to be a weaker argument, may be put as follows:

Weaker Argument

 

(1) To have deception itself as an end is to intend to deceive someone (simply) in order to have that person be deceived.

(2) To intend to deceive someone (simply) in order to have that person be deceived is malicious.

(3) So, to have deception itself as an end is malicious.

(4) God is all-good.

(5) So, God cannot be malicious.

(6) So, God cannot have deception itself as an end.

(7) God is all-powerful.

(8) God is all-knowing.

(9) So, God does not need to use any means in order to achieve any end.

(10) So, God does not need to use deception as a means in order to achieve any end.

(11) To use deception as a means to an end, when it is unnecessary to use deception as a means to that end, is malicious.

(12) So, God cannot use deception as a means to an end.

––> God cannot deceive.

This argument depends upon its being true that to intend to deceive someone (simply) in order to have that person be deceived is malicious, and that to use deception as a means to an end, when it is unnecessary to do so, is malicious. But Descartes is not on weak ground if he is relying upon these claims. This argument also depends upon its being true that God cannot be malicious. But he is certainly not on weak ground if he argues that God cannot be malicious. In general, the ethical claims of this argument are highly defensible.

The most controversial claim made in this argument is that God does not need to use any means in order to achieve any end. However, even if this claim is rejected, and hence, even if the argument is rejected, it is still possible to return to the stronger argument, which claims that deception is necessarily malicious. As I said, I believe that Descartes holds this position. The weaker argument is redundant.

One important point to make about either argument is that, if it is a sound argument, then it is a sound argument even if God does not exist. If it is true that "God... cannot be a deceiver", then this is true even if there is no God. Just as an atheist can accept that God cannot be weak or imperfect in any way and be God, an atheist can accept that God cannot deceive and be God.