Third Meditation:
"Concerning God, That He Exists"
The 'Trademark' (or Cosmological) Argument for the Existence of God
The purpose of the Third Meditation is to establish the existence and non-deceiving nature of God. Note that Descartes must not only establish that God exists, but also that God is not a deceiver. Only this will allow him to reply to the doubt he faced at the end of Meditation I, which was:
(1) If God exists, then God is a deceiver.
(2) If God is a deceiver, then I may be deceived in my reasoning.
(3) If God does not exist, then I am the product of chance.
(4) If I am the product of chance, then I may be deceived in my reasoning.
––> I may be deceived in my reasoning.
Descartes will first argue that "God does not exist" is false. He will argue that God does exist.
Hence, he need not worry about premises (3) and (4). This is not to say that premises (3) and (4) are false. They are not. They are simply irrelevant. For, even if it is true that <IF God does not exist, then I AM the product of chance>, it is false that God does not exist.
This leaves premises (1) and (2). Descartes will next argue that premise (1) is false. It is false that "God is a deceiver". Indeed, is self-contradictory. Hence, premise (2) is irrelevant.
However, it is important to see that Descartes needs more than the falsehood of premise (1) to reach the conclusion that it is not the case that he is deceived in his reasoning. This is because there is another possible premise -- the premise that "If God is not a deceiver, then I may be deceived in my reasoning."
Descartes must argue against this premise, in order to reach the conclusion that it is not the case that he may be deceived in his reasoning. Descartes will in fact replace this premise with a different premise, namely, "If God is not a deceiver, then I may not deceived in my reasoning". He will already have established that God does exist, and that God is not a deceiver. So his conclusion will be that I am not deceived in my reasoning.
More specifically, since the "reasoning" he is concerned with here is his clear and distinct ideas, his argument will be:
(1) If God exists, then God is not a deceiver.
(2) If God exists and is not a deceiver, then my clear and distinct ideas cannot be false.
(3) God exists.
(4) God is not a deceiver.
––> My clear and distinct ideas cannot be false.
However, not all of this is achieved in Meditation III. The Meditation is mainly concerned with (3) and (4).
In order to do this, Descartes will have to conduct an extensive investigation into the different kinds of thoughts that he has.
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In order to advance the 'Trademark' (or Cosmological) Argument for the Existence of God, Descartes first classifies his different thoughts.
THOUGHTS:
(a) Ideas ("a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God")
(b) Volitions and Affects ("I will, or fear") and Judgments ("[I] affirm, or deny")
Descartes distinguishes sharply between ideas on the one hand, and volitions and affects and judgments, on the other.
In the case of volitions and affects and judgments, "I embrace in my thought something more than the likeness of that thing" (p. 35). So, although it is true that in volitions and affects and judgments "there is always some thing that I grasp as the subject of my thought" (p. 35), nevertheless, there is always something more involved.
In the case of ideas, then, there is only "the likeness of that thing", and nothing more. That is, there is only the representational content, and nothing more.
In the case of volitions and affects and judgments, however, in addition to the representational content, there is some stance, attitude, etc., towards the representational content. Ideas, then, are simply ideas, but volitions, affects and judgments are ideas-plus-stance.
Descartes next argues that, by themselves, "ideas... cannot, properly speaking, be false" (p. 35) A lion's head, a goat's body and serpent's tail, is not, by itself, something that is either true or false. Just ideas, by themselves, are neither true nor false. Hence, they are not false.
[Note: Descartes does talk later on in Meditation III about "formal falsity" and "material falsity". 'Formal falsity' is the falsity he is concerned with here. However, he does admit that ideas may be 'materially false', i.e. "whenever they represent a non-thing as if it were a thing". So ideas, by themselves, may indeed by false in this sense. In general, whenever Descartes talks of an idea being false, what he normally means is that it is false that the thing that is represented by the idea exists outside the mind.]
Next, Descartes argues that volitions and affects are neither true nor false. Since they can neither be true nor false, it follows that they cannot be false. As he says "for although I can choose evil things or even things that are utterly non-existent, I cannot conclude from this that it is untrue that I do choose these things." (p. 35)
By a process of elimination, then, the only remaining thoughts that can be true or false are judgments.
"Thus there remain only judgments in which I must take care not to be mistaken." (p. 35)
The question that Descartes now asks is: how are judgments mistaken? One possible stance towards an idea that leads to a mistake, that is, to falsity, is the stance that the idea conforms to something existing outside the mind.
"Now the principal and most frequent error to be found in judgments consists in the fact that I judge that the ideas which are in me are similar to or in conformity with certain things outside me." (p. 35)
(Note, Descartes does not here say that this is the only way that judgments may be mistaken. The judgment that 'a square cannot be evenly divided', for example, is mistaken, but not because it fails to correspond to actually divided squares existing outside the mind.)
Descartes next argues that there are three kinds of ideas, corresponding to three ways that ideas originate. Since he has not yet proven that there exists an external world, he simply says that ideas "appear" to be of three kinds.
IDEAS (IN TERMS OF ORIGIN)
(i) "Innate" (prior to experience, i.e. from God)
(ii) "Adventitious" (from experience)
(iii) "Fictitious" (from imagination, mixing up (i) or (ii) or both)
Descartes gives examples of each of these three types of ideas:
(i) "a thing" [substance]; "truth"; "thought".
(ii) "noise"; "the sun"; "feeling the fire".
(iii) "sirens"; "hippogriffs".
Descartes first concerns himself with ideas of the second kind, adventitious ideas. For these ideas he normally considers to be "derived from things outside me" (p. 467) His reasons for believing that these ideas (e.g. noises, the sun, heat -- ideas of sense) derived from things that exist outside his mind are as follows:
(1) "I have been taught so by nature", i.e. "I am driven by a spontaneous impulse to believe this" (p. 35)
(2) "these ideas do not depend upon my will" (and are sometimes "even against my will" (p. 35))
(Both of these claims will be relevant later in Meditation VI, when Descartes argues for the existence of the external, extended material world.)
Descartes is careful to point out here, however, that neither of these reasons are "powerful enough" (p. 35) to prove the existence of the external extended material world. He has replies to both:
(~1) "As far as natural impulses are concerned, in the past I have often judged myself to have been driven by them to make the poorer choice when it was a question of choosing a good; and I fail to see why I should place any greater faith in them in other matters." (p. 35)
(~2) "perhaps there is in me some other faculty, one not yet sufficiently known to me, which produces these ideas, just as it has always seemed up to now that ideas are formed in me without any help from external things when I am asleep." (p. 36)
Furthermore, Descartes argues, even if it were true that ideas of sense did come from outside the mind, that would not establish that the external world at all resembled the ideas of sense. For example, the idea of the sun that is obtained from the senses is that of a very small object. But in fact the sun is gigantic, much bigger than the entire planet Earth. Hence the sun does not resemble the idea of the sun that I have from the senses.
"I find within myself two distinct ideas of the sun. One is drawn, as it were, from the senses... By means of this idea the sun appears to me to be quite small. But there is another idea, one derived from astronomical reasoning, that is, it is elicited from certain notions that are innate in me, or else fashioned by me in some other way. Through this idea the sun is shown to be several times larger than the earth. Both ideas surely cannot resemble the same sun existing outside me; and reason convinces me that the idea that seems to have emanated from the sun itself from so close is the very one that least resembles the sun." (p. 36)
The point of these three arguments is simply to establish that he cannot rely on ideas of sense as being representative of an external world. Hence:
"It was not a well-founded judgment but only a blind impulse that formed the basis of my belief that things existing outside me send ideas or images of themselves to me through the sense organs or by some other means." (p. 36)
Descartes next moves to considering "still another way.. for inquiring whether some of the things of which there are ideas in me do exist outside of me". (p. 36)
It should be noted here, however, that there is a difference between:
(a) Ideas of things existing outside of me that are derived from things existing outside of me.
(b) Ideas of things existing outside of me that are not derived from things existing outside of me.
That is, just because I have an idea of something existing outside of me, it does not follow that it was derived from something existing outside of me. As Descartes will argue, my idea of God is an idea of something existing outside of me (i.e. God exists outside of me). However, this idea was not derived from anything existing outside of me. This idea is from inside me, namely, it is innate.
We now have
the 'Trademark" (or Cosmological) Argument proper.
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Considered simply as ideas, all ideas are equally real or exist in the same way: "insofar as these ideas are merely modes of thought, I see no inequality among them" (p. 36). My idea of a square is just as real as my idea of God. Here ideas are simply considered as psychological existences.
However, another way to distinguish between ideas is in terms of what they represent, that is, in terms of their content. Again, without being able to say for certain that there really exists anything that corresponds to his ideas, he holds that there seem to be ideas of three kinds, corresponding to three kinds of existing things:
IDEAS (IN TERMS OF CONTENT)
(I) Idea of infinite substance (i.e. idea of "supreme deity, eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things other than himself" (p. 36), i.e. God)
(II) Ideas of finite substances (i.e. idea of finite extended substance (e.g. idea of a car) and idea of finite thinking substance (e.g. idea of a soul))
(III) Ideas of properties [modes, accidents] (e.g. idea of red (property of finite extended substance), idea of fear (property of finite thinking substance))
These three different kinds of ideas correspond to three different kinds of things:
EXISTING THINGS
(I) Infinite substance (i.e. God)
(II) Finite substances (i.e. extended bodies and souls)
(III) Properties (e.g. redness, fear)
Descartes argues that existing things differ according to levels of what he calls "formal reality" or what we might simply call existence. That is, there is a hierarchy: an infinite substance has more formal reality, or exists more than, a finite substance; and a finite substances has more formal reality, or exists more than, a property. One might say, for example, that a finite substance, such as a car, exists more than a property, say the color red.
(What lies behind this position is that properties are properties of substances –– they need substances in order to exist, and so are dependent on them. But substances are not dependent on properties for their existence. If X is dependent on Y, but Y is not dependent on X, then Y is superior to X. One way to put this is to say that properties are captured by adjectives, and substances are captured by nouns. There cannot simply exist red. It must always be a red X. There can, however, simply exist a car. Finite substances in turn are dependent upon an infinite substances to exist, however. A car exists only because God created the world (etc.) and God allows the car to remain existing. An infinite substance is not dependent upon anything to exist. God exists because it is of the nature of God to exist. If God didn't exist, God wouldn't be God).
Descartes argues that the three kinds of ideas, corresponding to the three kinds of things, also have a hierarchy. Ideas differ according to levels of what he calls "objective reality", or complexity of representational content, as I shall call it. The idea of an infinite substance has more objective reality, or has more complexity of representational content, than the idea of a finite substance, and the idea of a finite substance has more objective reality, or has more complexity of representational content, than the idea of a property. One might say, for example, that the idea of car is a more complex idea, has more complex representational content, than the idea of red.
Both of these hierarchies may also be presented in terms of "perfection". Infinite substance is "more perfect" than finite substance, and finite substance is "more perfect" than property. In the case of ideas, the idea of an infinite substance is a "more perfect" idea than the idea of a finite substance, and the idea of a finite substance is a "more perfect" idea than the idea of a property.
Descartes next states two principles (and assumes another) which he simply says are true by the "light of nature" (p. 468). That is, they are clearly and distinctly perceived, so they are true.
(1) "something cannot come into being out of nothing" (p. 36)
(no such thing as creation from nothing: "ex nihilo, nihil fit" (out of nothing, nothing comes))
Since some philosophers have argued that premise (1) is only about nothing, i.e. what it (nothing) can't do, and that it doesn't say anything about something that is already existing, it seems that a variation on premise (1) is also needed, something which is assumed to be equivalent to premise (1) by Descartes:
(1.1) Everything has a cause
The second principle stated by Descartes is as follows:
(2) "what is more perfect (that is, what contains in itself more reality) cannot come into being from what is less perfect" (p. 36)
Greater cannot come from lesser; this is sometimes known as the principle of the 'non-inferiority of the cause'. It may be put more simply as follows:
(2.1) A cause cannot be inferior to its effect.
A cause may be equal to its effect, or superior to its effect. It just may not be inferior to its effect.
From these principles he argues as follows. In general, things that exist have causes. And the cause of something must be at least as perfect -- must have at least as much formal reality -- as the effect in order to produce an effect. So, for example, one finite substance can cause another finite substance, because they have equal amounts of perfection or formal reality. However, a property cannot cause a finite substance, because a property does not have as much formal reality as a finite substance. Causes, however, may have much more perfection, or formal reality, than their effects. For example, God can create a finite substance. In the case of God creating a finite substance, God is said to contain the perfection or formal reality of the finite substance "eminently". In the case of a finite substance causing a finite substance, the finite substance is said to contain the perfection or formal reality of the other finite substance "formally".
Descartes now applies this result to ideas.
An idea cannot come into being out of nothing. Like everything else, an idea must have a cause. However, the cause of an idea must be capable of producing that idea. Some causes are simply not capable of producing some ideas.
A property can cause the idea of a property. For example, the color red can cause the idea of the color red. But a property cannot cause the idea of a finite substance. For example, the color red cannot cause the idea of a car. Nor can any number of properties --- color, shape, smell, texture, etc., combined together --- cause the idea of a car. Only a finite substance, or something greater (i.e. an infinite substance), can cause an idea of a finite substance.
(Of course, Descartes would also say that properties always come attached to substances, so that they never have the chance to cause ideas of substances 'by themselves'. Furthermore, even if, say, there was an illusion of a car, it would be some "Evil Genius", and not properties (since they do not exist, if it is a mere illusion !), that would be causing you to have the idea of the car. In other words, the "Evil Genius" is 'more real' than an illusory car, hence it is possible for it in order to cause an illusion of a car.)
As he says:
"there can be in me no idea of heat [idea of property], or of a stone [idea of finite substance], unless it is placed in me by some cause that has at least as much reality as I conceive to be in the heat [property itself] or the stone [finite substance itself]" (p. 36)
Descartes does concede that, in general, it is possible for a much greater cause to produce a much lesser idea. For example, God contains "eminently" the reality or perfection of the stone, so God can indeed give me an idea of a stone.
Since substances are more perfect that properties, only substances can cause ideas of substances -- properties cannot. And since infinite substances are more perfect than finite substances, only infinite substances can cause ideas of infinite substances -- finite substances, such as souls, cannot. Thus ideas can be less perfect (or as perfect) as their causes, but ideas cannot possibly be more perfect than their causes.
"Thus it is clear to me by the light of nature that the ideas that are in me are like images that can easily fail to match the perfection of the things from which they have been drawn, but which can contain nothing greater or more perfect" (p. 37)
Here is the hypothesis that Descartes now entertains:
"If the objective reality of any of my ideas is found to be so great that I am certain that the same reality was not in me, either formally or eminently, and that therefore I myself cannot be the cause of the idea, then it necessarily follows that I am not alone in the world, but that something else, which is the cause of this idea, also exists." (p. 37)
That is, IF Descartes finds in himself an idea that has so much objective reality (so much perfection, or so much complexity of representational content) that he does not himself (or indeed, any other mind or soul, if there is one, or any number of them) have enough formal reality (as a soul, or finite substance), either eminently or formally, to cause the idea himself, THEN something else must have caused this idea. And that something else must exist. And so he is "not alone in the world".
[Here Descartes examines his various ideas, but I will move to the important idea for the purposes of the argument.]
Now, Descartes has an idea of God: "I understand by the name "God" a certain substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and that created me along with everything else that exists" (p. 38)
This is an idea of an infinite substance. Like every other idea, this idea must have been caused. But by what? Not by a property, obviously. Not even by a finite substance, such as a car or a horse or even a mind (i.e. Descartes's own mind). They simply aren't perfect enough. The idea of God has more objective reality, or more complexity of representational content, than any other idea. The only thing that is perfect enough to be the cause of the idea of God is... God.
"all these [elements of the idea of God] are such that, the more carefully I focus my attention on them, the less possible it seems they could have arisen from myself alone. Thus, from what has been said, I must conclude that God necessarily exists.
For although the idea of substance is in me by virtue of the fact that I am a substance, that fact is not sufficient to explain my having the idea of an infinite substance, since I am finite, unless this idea proceeded from some substance which really was infinite." (p. 38)
The argument may be briefly put as follows:
(1) If an idea exists, then the cause of that idea exists.
(2) I have an idea of a God.
(3) So, the cause of my idea of God exists.
(4) The only possible cause of my idea of God is God.
——> God exists.
Note: this argument is a version of the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God. This argument in general moves from the existence of something (e.g. the universe) to God as the only possible cause of it, on the basis of the principle that everything that exists has a cause. Descartes's argument is a variation on this because he moves from the existence of something (i.e. the idea of God) to God as the only possible cause of it.
His version of the cosmological argument is known as the "mark of the craftsman" or "trademark" argument. God, as it were, leaves a mark on every soul created. The mark is the idea of God.
"it is not astonishing that in creating me, God should have endowed me with this idea, so that it would be like the mark of the craftsman impressed upon his work" (p. 40)
Premise (1) of the trademark argument for the existence of God is an implication of the principle that everything has a cause. Premise (4) is an implication of the principle that greater cannot come from lesser. Both of these principles Descartes takes to be true simply by thinking about them clearly and distinctly.
The argument for premise (4) in the argument above can be put as follows:
(1*) The idea of God is the idea of a infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, all-loving being, creator of this world and everything in it (etc.)
(2*) No property, or collection of properties, could cause this idea.
(3*) No finite extended substance, or collection of finite extended substances, could cause this idea.
(4*) No finite thinking substance, or collection of finite thinking substances, could cause this idea.
—> The only possible cause of the idea of God is an an infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful (etc., etc.) being.
[ —> i.e. The only possible cause of the idea of God is God. ]
When this conclusion is combined with the knowledge that I do in fact have this idea of God (i.e premise (2) in the argument above), then God must exist, since ideas have causes like everything else.
There is something very important to note about the argument for premise (4), and about premise (4) itself. If the argument for premise (4) is sound, and if premise (4) is true, then just this on its own does not entail that God exists.
It might be true that the only possible cause of the idea of God is God, and yet, that God not exist. Why? Because maybe I don't have an idea of an infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, all-loving (etc.) being. Maybe I just have a rather messy, thrown-together, vague (etc.) projection of ordinary human characteristics, and not the idea that Descartes says I do (and says that everyone does, even if they are currently too lazy or preoccupied to reflect).
Note that this does not entail that there is no God either. There might be a God even though I don't have an idea of God !
This strategy would be to accept premise (4) but to attack premise (2): I have an idea of a God.
Descartes defends premise (2) from such an objection. He argues that he really does have a positive idea of an infinite (etc.) being, and not merely a negative idea of 'a being that is not finite'.
"Nor should I think that I do not perceive the infinite by means of a true idea, but only through a negation of the finite... On the contrary, I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than there is in a finite one." (p. 38)
Descartes makes an interesting argument here, an argument that it is only because I have an idea of God that I know that I am finite, that I am imperfect, that there are things that I lack and cannot do, etc. So the idea of God (and thus of perfection) actually precedes the idea I have of myself. If anything, then, I understand myself negatively, as a 'being that is not infinite', as opposed to understanding God negatively, as a 'being that is not finite'.
"Thus the perception of the infinite, that is, my perception of God is prior to my perception of myself. For how would I understand that I doubt and that I desire, that is, that I lack something and that I am not wholly perfect, unless there were some idea in me of a more perfect being, by comparison with which I might recognize my defects?" (p. 38)
Another objection that Descartes deals with is the idea that perhaps the idea of God that he has is 'materially false', that is, that it is confused and obscure, and hence, that he cannot know if it represents a thing or a "non-thing", i.e. nothing. Descartes's response is that, on the contrary, the idea of God that he has is clear and distinct -- indeed, it is the most clear and distinct idea that he has, and it contains more "objective reality" than any other idea he has. That is, it is the most perfect idea that he has -- it has the most complex representational content.
"On the contrary, because it is the most clear and distinct and because it contains more objective reality than any other idea, no idea is in and of itself truer and has less of a basis for being suspected of falsehood... of all the ideas that are in me, the idea that I have of God is the most true, the most clear and the most distinct." (p. 38)
Despite the claim that his idea of God is clearer and more distinct than any other idea he has, Descartes admits that he does not fully comprehend God or know all of God's perfections. This is, however, the nature of a finite mind, according to Descartes, and does not affect the fact that he knows that God has all perfections, some of which he knows and others of which he does not.
"It is no objection that I do not comprehend the infinite or that there are countless other things in God that I can in no way either comprehend or perhaps even touch with with my thought. For the nature of the infinite is such that it is not comprehended by a being such as I, who am finite. And it is sufficient that I understand this very point and judge that all those things that I clearly perceive and that I know to contain some perfection -- and perhaps even countless other things of which I am ignorant -- are in God either formally or eminently." (p. 38)
However, another strategy would be to ignore premise (2), that is, to grant that we do indeed have a magnificent clear and distinct idea of God, and attack premise (4): The only possible cause of my idea of God is God.
Descartes entertains an objection of this kind, namely, that I could have devised the idea of God all by myself.
"But perhaps I am something greater than I myself understand. Perhaps all these perfections that I am attributing to God are somehow in me potentially, although they do not yet assert themselves and are not yet actualized. For now I observe that my knowledge is gradually being increased, and I see nothing standing in the way of its being increased more and more to infinity. Moreover, I see no reason why, with my knowledge thus increased, I could not acquire all the remaining perfections of God. And, finally, if the potential for these perfections is in me already, I see no reason why this potential would not suffice to produce the idea of these perfections." (p. 39)
Descartes gives short shrift to this objection. First, he argues that his idea of God contains nothing that is in God potentially, but only that which is in God actually. So he cannot derive his idea of God from himself, even if he is potentially perfect. Secondly, he will never be actually infinite "because it will never reach a point where it is incapable of greater increase" (p. 39). Thirdly, Descartes would have to be actually perfect to cause an idea of a being that is actually perfect. Even if he was potentially perfect, he could not cause an idea of a being that is actually perfect.
However, let us consider the general principle that lies behind premise (4), that the less perfect cannot cause the more perfect.
It could be argued that it is indeed possible for the more perfect to come from the less perfect, or at least, the more complex to come from the less complex. Mammals, for example, are (perhaps) descendents of single-celled organisms. If this is so, then is it possible for the more complex idea of God to somehow be derived from the less complex ideas that are caused by finite substances and their properties? (Is God just a projection of myself, and/or other souls, and their properties?)
Descartes entertains one last argument against his own 'Trademark' argument, namely, that there is a "variety" of perfections in the universe, and that these perfections have together given him ideas of perfections, which together give him the idea of a being with all perfections:
"perhaps several partial causes have concurred in bringing me into being, and that I have taken the ideas of the various perfections I attribute to God from a variety of causes, so that all of these perfections are found somewhere in the universe, but not all joined together in a single being - God." (p. 40)
Descartes's reply is that his idea of God is an idea of a unity of perfections, and that it is impossible for a variety to cause the idea of a unity:
"On the contrary, the unity, the simplicity, that is, the inseparability of all those features that are in God is one of the chief perfections that I understand to be in him. Certainly the idea of the unity of all his perfections could not have been placed in me by any cause from which I did not also get the ideas of the other perfections; for neither could some cause have made me understand them joined together and inseparable from one another, unless it also caused me to recognize what they were." (p. 40)
Descartes, then, does defend his 'trademark' argument from possible objections. Still, the main two objections are that (1) the argument would be sound if he had the clear and distinct idea of God that he says he has (which would have to be different in order from every other idea he has), but in fact he lacks a clear and distinct idea of God; and that (2) the argument is unsound because even if he had such an idea, it could be caused by a substance or substances less perfect, such as his own mind.