Meditation IV:
"Concerning the True and the False"
Meditation IV has at least two objectives. The first is to establish that even though Descartes makes mistakes in his reasoning (in the case of perceptions that are not clear and distinct), nevertheless, this does not entail that God is a deceiver. In other words, it is possible both that God is not a deceiver and that God's creations make mistakes when reasoning. The second, related, objective is to establish that clear and distinct perceptions must be true, otherwise God would be a deceiver. Thus the Meditation establishes that human error is compatible with God's non-deceiving nature, and that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true.
At the end of the Third Meditation Descartes argued that God cannot be a deceiver, since all deception is a result of some imperfection, and God has no imperfections (God is perfect). Descartes reiterates this point at the beginning of the Fourth Meditation:
"To begin with, I acknowledge that it is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attests to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God." (p. 41)
Note that Descartes does grant that God has the ability to deceive him. It is just that God does not will to deceive him -- God does not have the malicious or evil intention to deceive him. God has the power, but would never exercise this power. To do so would be to be imperfect, and God is perfect. (For the argument for this, see Meditation III, God is not a Deceiver).
Descartes also concluded in Meditation III that God created him, because only God could have created him, and that God must sustain or conserve him in existence, since he can only remain in existence through God's power (Creation Argument for the Existence of God).
This means that God created and conserves his faculties. Since his faculties come from God, these faculties should be perfect, or at least, 'perfect in their kind'.
By 'perfect in their kind' he means as perfect as they can be, given what they are by their nature or essence, i.e. given their essential limitations. For example, it is an essential limitation of a body that it cannot think. So even a perfect body will not be able to think. As we will see, he claims that it is an essential limitation of a created human intellect that it does not possess every clear and distinct idea; so even if the created human intellect is perfect in its kind, it will not have every clear and distinct idea.
"And when I attend to the nature of God, it seems impossible that he would have placed in me a faculty that is not perfect in its kind or that is lacking some perfection it ought to have." (p. 42)
Now, Descartes says that he experiences, or seems to experience, in him, a faculty of judgment:
"I experience that there is in me a certain faculty of judgment, which, like everything else that is in me, I undoubtedly received from God." (p. 41)
Nevertheless, Descartes knows that he often makes mistaken judgments or commits errors:
"I nevertheless experience that I am subject to countless errors" (p. 41)
"I make mistakes" (p. 41)
The problem is that God, who never deceives, appears to have given Descartes a faculty of judgment by which he sometimes makes mistakes. It appears, then, that God intends that Descartes is makes mistakes, at least on occasion, by means of the flawed faculty of judgment that He has given him. But this means that God does indeed have the will to deceive.
(This would be like God giving someone a car with faulty breaks -- He would be willing that the person crash.)
Descartes's response is to say that, first of all, his "faculty of judgment" is a combination of two distinct faculties. Each of these faculties is perfect in its kind. Secondly, it is as a result of the interaction between these two faculties that mistaken judgments or errors are made. When the faculties are used correctly, then I can be assured of truth. When they are not, then I cannot be assured of truth. Even if I obtain truth, I am not assured of doing so. And almost always, I make mistakes when I do not use these two faculties correctly.
What Descartes does in Meditation IV, then, is to establish that (a) clear and distinct ideas are true, and must be true, short of God being a deceiver; and (b) when I make mistakes on the basis of ideas that are not clear and distinct, this does not entail that God is a deceiver.
Descartes holds that he has at least two faculties that come into play whenever he makes a mistake:
(a) Faculty of understanding
(b) Faculty of choosing
His other names for these faculties are:
(a) Intellect
(b) Will
By means of the faculty of understanding (or the faculty of knowing), that is, the intellect, he perceives ideas. This perceiving, in itself, is neither correct nor mistaken. The job of the intellect is simply to perceive, or have, ideas.
"Through the intellect alone I merely perceive ideas... Strictly speaking, no error is to be found in the intellect when properly viewed in this manner." (p. 42)
(Descartes talks in terms of ideas here, but since ideas in themselves are strictly speaking neither true nor false (e.g. "triangle" and "God" are neither true nor false, because they do not say anything), it must be remembered that 'idea' is shorthand for some propositional thought, such as "triangles have angles totaling 180 degrees" or "God exists").
By means of the faculty of choosing, or the will, he affirms, or denies, or suspends judgment on, the ideas that have been perceived by the intellect:
"willing is merely a matter of being able to... affirm or deny... the will consists solely in the fact that when something is proposed to us by our intellect either to affirm or deny... we are moved in such a way that we sense that we are determined to it by no external force" (p. 43)
There is, however, an important difference between the two faculties of the mind, the intellect and the will. The intellect is limited, whereas the will is unlimited.
The intellect is limited in two ways. First of all, it does not perceive all the ideas that can possibly be perceived. It only perceives, or has, a certain number of them. That limitation, in itself, is not an error, or the cause of error. Secondly, the intellect does not always perceive ideas clearly and distinctly (or, some of its ideas are not clear and distinct). That limitation, in itself, is not an error, or the cause of error, either, however.
"If, for example, I consider the faculty of understanding, I immediately recognize that in my case it is very small and quite limited" (p. 42)
(It is important here to note the difference between ignorance and error. If I am ignorant of something, then I lack knowledge of something. But I have not made a mistake, or committed an error, simply because I am ignorant of something. For example, if I don't know how many windows there are in Newcomb Hall, then I am ignorant of the number of windows in the building. But I haven't made a mistake. However, if I count the number on each floor, and then, when adding the floor totals, I fail to 'carry the one' (or whatever), and obtain an incorrect result, then I have made a mistake, or committed an error.)
The faculty of choosing, or the will, in contrast, is unlimited. It can affirm, deny, or suspend judgment on any idea that is presented to it, and not merely a certain number of them. It ranges over unclear and indistinct perceptions as well as clear and distinct perceptions. This lack of limitation is not an error, or a cause of error, either.
"It is only the will or free choice that I experience to be so great in me that I cannot grasp the idea of any greater faculty.... God's faculty of willing does not appear to be any greater." (p. 42-3)
Neither faculty, or "power", then, is (by itself) the cause of errors:
"the power of willing... is not, taken by itself, the cause of my errors... Nor is my power of understanding the cause of my errors" (p. 43)
Each faculty may be said to be "perfect in its kind" and not the cause of error. The will, as an infinite faculty, is perfect in its kind. It does what it does as an infinite faculty, i.e. judge any and all ideas, without error. The intellect, as a finite faculty, is also perfect in its kind. It does what it does as a finite faculty, i.e. perceive ideas, without error.
Error occurs when the two faculties interact in a certain way -- or really, when I, who am distinct from both faculties, use them in a certain way.
"I note that these errors depend on the simultaneous concurrence of two causes: the faculty of knowing that is in me and the faculty of choosing, that is, the free choice of the will, in other words, simultaneously on the intellect and will." (p. 42)
In order to understand what happens here, it is necessary to understand a further claim that Descartes makes about the relationship between the will and some ideas that are presented to it by the intellect.
When the intellect has a clear and distinct idea, then I cannot but affirm it. I may stop thinking about it, distract myself, etc. But so long as I have the clear and distinct idea, I cannot but affirm it. It is in my nature to affirm clear and distinct ideas, or perceptions. Note that this is still a free act of my mind (indeed, the most free act). I am not coerced into affirming it. For that would be to affirm it not because of its clarity and distinctness, but merely as some sort of response to a stimulus. This free affirmation, however, is a judgment of mine, based upon the clarity and distinctness of the idea.
"I exist... I could not help judging that what I understood so clearly was true; not that I was coerced into making this judgment because of some external force, but because a great light gave way to a great inclination in my will, and the less indifferent I was, the more spontaneously and freely did I believe it." (p. 43)
When the intellect has an idea that is not clear and distinct, however, then I am in a state of indifference towards it. This is where the idea is clear but indistinct (he has in mind a sense perception, e.g. a pain in my foot), or else is unclear and indistinct.
"However, the indifference that I experience when there is no reason moving me more in one direction than another is the lowest grade of freedom" (p. 43)
If I am in a state of indifference towards an idea, then it is not the case that I must affirm it.
Descartes allowed for at least two different kinds of indifference. In the first, there is a balance of reasons for and against. In the second, there is an imbalance of reasons, either in favor of the idea, or against the idea, without, however, there being a clear and distinct idea.
When I have an idea that is not clear and distinct –– that is, when I am in a state of indifference –– I have three options available to me, as opposed to one. I may affirm it, I may deny it, or I may suspend judgment. Importantly, then, when I am indifferent to an idea, it is possible for me to affirm or deny it.
Thus the possibilities are as follows:
(1) Clear and distinct idea
State: Spontaneous endorsement
Judgment: Affirm
(2) Idea that is not clear and distinct
State: Indifference
Judgment:
(i) Affirm
(ii) Deny
(iii) Suspend Judgment
In the case of an idea that is not clear and distinct, it is not necessarily the case that the idea is false. It is possible for some idea to actually be true, and yet, for it not to be clear and distinct to my mind. However, it is of course also possible for it to be false.
When I, provided with a perception that is not clear and distinct, affirm it, when it is in fact false, then I make a mistake. Or when I, provided with a perception that is not clear and distinct, deny it, when it is in fact true, then I make a mistake.
"What then is the source of my errors? They are owing simply to the fact that, since the will extends further than the intellect, I do not contain the will within the same boundaries; rather, I also extend it to things I do not understand. Because the will is indifferent in regard to such matters, it easily turns away from the true and the good; and in this way I am deceived and I sin." (p. 43)
(Note that the translation says that "I am deceived" in these cases. But this is speaking loosely. There is a difference between saying "I am mistaken" and "I am deceived". Nobody is "deceiving me" when I make a mistake, in the sense that I am being deceived when someone else plays a trick on me. Nor is it the case that I am deceiving myself -- it is not the case, for example, that I believe something, but nevertheless somehow affirm the opposite. Rather, I affirm or deny something that is not warranted, and I get it wrong. I am in a state of having a false belief, and so, am in a state of "being deceived" about some matter. But it is not correct that I am deceived by someone, or by myself.)
(Here Descartes does say "I sin". However, in the Second Replies, Descartes says that "it is a sin to make a judgment before the case is known". So affirming anything at all (even what turns out to be true!) on insufficient evidence is always a sin. No harm may come of it, either to others or myself. Indeed, if it is true, then good may come of it. But it is a sin, in itself, to affirm or deny something on insufficient evidence. That means that I can sin and not make a mistake.)
In cases where I have an unclear and/or indistinct idea, what I should do is suspend judgment, until I have reached clarity and distinctness. Of course, this may never occur, in which case, I should never affirm or deny it, but always suspend judgment on it.
"But if I hold off from making a judgment when I do not perceive what is true with sufficient clarity and distinctness, it is clear that I am acting properly and am not committing an error. But if instead I were to make an assertion or a denial, then I am not using my freedom properly." (p. 43)
(Descartes is not saying here that I should do nothing. If, for example, I am not certain that the external world exists, then, just because I suspend judgment on whether or not it exists, it does not mean that I do not continue to do philosophy or live my life. It simply means that I do all of this while suspending judgment on whether the external world exists!)
If I adopt the policy to:
(a) Affirm all clear and distinct ideas
(b) Suspend judgment on all other ideas
then according to Descartes I will never make any mistakes or never be deceived. (Really, I have no option but to adopt (a), since it is my nature to spontaneously affirm all clear and distinct ideas. The optional part is (b), since my nature is such that I may affirm, deny or suspend judgment on ideas that are not clear and distinct).
"for as often as I restrain my will when I make judgments, so that it extends only to those matters that the intellect clearly and distinctly discloses to it, it plainly cannot happen that I err." (p. 44)
This conclusion only follows, however, if it is true that my clear and distinct perceptions are always true. Descartes does believe that this is the case. As he says:
"For every clear and distinct perception is surely something, and hence it cannot come from nothing. On the contrary, it must necessarily have God for its author: God, I say, that supremely perfect being to whom it is repugnant to be a deceiver. Therefore the perception is most assuredly true." (p. 44)
Descartes does have an argument for this conclusion about clear and distinct ideas or perceptions, on the basis of God's not being a deceiver. The argument may put as follows:
(1) I exist.
(2) I have such a nature that if I clearly and distinctly perceive that p, then I must spontaneously affirm that p.
(3) God exists.
(4) My nature was given to me by God.
(5) If it is possible that, when I clearly and distinctly perceive that p, and hence, must spontaneously affirm that p, p is false, then God has given me a nature such that it is possible that I must spontaneously affirm a falsehood.
(6) If God has given me a nature such that it is possible that I must spontaneously affirm a falsehood, then God is a deceiver.
(7) God is not a deceiver.
(8) So, it is not the case that God gave me a nature such that it is possible that I must spontaneously affirm a falsehood.
----> It is not possible that, when I clearly and distinctly perceive that p, and hence, must spontaneously affirm that p, p is false.
----> If I clearly and distinctly perceive that p, then p is true.
The point of this argument is that if I am not free to suspend judgment on clear and distinct perceptions, if I have a nature such that I must spontaneously affirm them, then it is God's fault, not mine, if it is even possible for any of them to be false. If it is even possible for any of them to be false, then God has given me a nature such that it is possible for me to be mistaken through absolutely no fault of my own. However, for God to do this would be for God to be a deceiver. And God is not a deceiver. Hence it is not even possible for any of my clear and distinct perceptions to be false.
This argument, if sound, only (!) establishes that clear and distinct ideas or perceptions are true. It does not yet establish that God is not in any way responsible for human error, when it occurs. Hence a second argument is needed. The argument may be put as follows:
(1) I exist.
(2) I have a nature such that, if I do not clearly and distinctly perceive that p, then I may freely affirm, deny, or suspend judgment, that p.
(3) So, I have a nature such that, if I do not clearly and distinctly perceive that p, then I may freely affirm that p, even if p is false.
(4) So, I have a nature such that I may freely affirm a falsehood.
(5) God exists.
(6) My nature was given to me by God.
(7) God has given me a nature such that I may freely affirm a falsehood.
(8) To give a person a nature such that he or she may freely affirm a falsehood is not to deceive that person.
(9) God is not a deceiver.
---> I have a nature such that I may freely affirm a falsehood and God is not a deceiver.
The point of this argument is that if I am free to suspend judgment on perceptions that are not clear and distinct, if I have a nature such that I may freely suspend judgment on them, then it is my fault, not God's, if I ever, freely, instead of suspending judgment, affirm (or deny) a perception that is not clear and distinct. I am free to suspend judgment on perceptions that are not clear and distinct. God has given me a nature such that it is possible for me to freely suspend judgment on them. Hence it is my fault, not God's, if I ever, freely, instead of suspending judgment, affirm (or deny) a perception that is not clear and distinct. Hence it is my fault, not God's, if that perception is false and I am mistaken. (Note that it is also my responsibility, and not God's, if that perception is true, and I am correct!)
These arguments are supposed to exonerate God (if we are ever deceived, it is our own fault) and demonstrate that, if we use God's gifts correctly, we will never be deceived. However, these arguments may fall victim to the problem of the Cartesian Circle (for an argument that there is no Cartesian Circle, however, see The Cartesian Circle). Quite apart from possibly being circular, they rely upon premises that Descartes may have failed to establish as true, such as the (necessary) existence of God (implied wherever it is asserted that I have a nature given to me by God).
Even if the arguments for the compatibility of our error-prone nature and God's non-deceptive nature are sound, however, this may not be enough to exonerate God from all criticisms. Several other criticisms may be made. Just because God doesn't deceive, it doesn't follow that He is not otherwise morally deficient.
First of all, why did God not give me an infinite intellect, one with all clear and distinct ideas? Or even a finite intellect, but a much better one, stocked with nothing but clear and distinct ideas, even if it doesn't have all of them? Neither intellect would transform me into God, it seems (even in the first case I would still lack omnipotence, and perhaps many other perfections, such as omni-benevolence), so that would not be the problem.
"I have no cause for complaint on the grounds that God has not given me a greater power of understanding or a greater light of nature than he has, for it is of the essence of a finite intellect not to understand many things, and it is of the essence of a created intellect to be finite. Actually, instead of thinking that he has withheld from me or deprived me of those things that he has not given me, I ought to thank God, who never owed me anything, for what he has bestowed upon me." (p. 44)
This argument, the 'Just be grateful that God was good enough to give you an intellect at all' argument, is extremely weak. Even if it is the essence of a finite intellect not to understand "many" things (why does it have to be many things that are not understood? why not just one or two things? wouldn't that be enough to make it finite?), it seems false that "it is the essence of a created intellect to be finite". After all, the will is a created faculty, and yet the will is infinite, according to Descartes!
Perhaps Descartes does have an argument here, however. The argument is that the intellect and will differ insofar as the will is one thing -- it is indivisible -- whereas the intellect is not one thing -- it is divisible. Hence, the will may be infinite, but the intellect must be finite:
"Again, I have no cause for complaint on the grounds that God has given me a will that has a wider scope than my intellect. For since the will consists of merely one thing, something indivisible, as it were, it does not seem that its nature could withstand anything being removed from it." (p. 44)
This argument, however, seems unsound. If one faculty, the will, is "merely one thing, something indivisible", then it would seem that another faculty, the intellect, should be merely one thing, and indivisible, also. (For Descartes, the entire mind is one thing, and indivisible.)
Another related criticism can be made. Even if it is true that God is not a deceiver, and is not the cause of our errors, and so, is in no way responsible for our errors -- they are due to our own misuse of our finite intellect and infinite will -- isn't it true, nevertheless, that God allows us to make these errors? Doesn't God, as it were, 'stand at the sidelines', and not intervene to stop us? Doesn't this mean that He somehow cooperates with our errors? Descartes puts this in terms of God's concurring with our errors:
"I should not complain because God concurs with me in eliciting those acts of the will, that is those judgments, in which I am mistaken. For insofar as those acts depend on God, they are absolutely true and good; and in a certain sense, there is greater perfection in me in being to elicit those acts than in not being able to do so. But privation, in which alone the defining characteristic of falsehood and wrong-doing is to be found, has no need whatever for God's concurrence, since a privation is not a thing, nor, when it is related to God as its cause, is it to be called a privation, but simply a negation." (p. 44)
This is the doctrine, already referred to (see God is not a Deceiver), that falsehood or error, and wrong-doing or evil, are not real or actual qualities, but merely the lack, or privation, of real or actual qualities. Falsehood or error is simply the lack of truth, and wrong-doing or evil is simply the lack of right-doing or good. Hence God does not concur with, i.e. does not allow, falsehood and wrong-doing or evil, because these are not real. There is nothing there to concur or allow!
The trouble with this argument is that it includes the denial of the reality of falsehood or error and wrong-doing or evil. (There is no longer any problem of the compatibility of God's goodness with them, because they don't exist!) On the face of it, that seems incredible. In any case, no argument is provided to support this denial. If it is true, then more work needs to be done.
There remain two questions for Descartes. God could have eliminated the possibility of error entirely either by:
(a) "endowing my intellect with a clear and distinct perception of everything about which I would ever deliberate" (p. 44)
(b) "or by simply impressing the following rule so firmly on my memory that I could never forget it: I should never judge anything that I do not clearly and distinctly understand." (p. 44)
Why didn't God do either of these things? The first possibility, as was argued above, would not turn Descartes into God. (After all, Descartes already has one infinite faculty, and he is not God yet!) The second possibility would not in itself undermine Descartes's free will, or faculty of choosing. Not being able to forget the rule is different from always obeying it.
Descartes says that he does not know, but that he cannot rule out the possibility (which is different from positively claiming) that somehow his 'freedom to err' is all for the best...
"But I cannot therefore deny that it may somehow be a greater perfection in the universe as a whole that some of its parts are not immune to error, while others are, than if all of them were exactly alike. And I have no right to complain that the part God has wished me to play is not the principal and most perfect one of all." (p. 44)
One final objection, raised in the Fifth Set of Objections by Gassendi, should not be omitted. Gassendi argues that the will and the intellect are in fact equal. The will can only make judgments about ideas provided by the intellect, so it cannot 'out-run' the intellect. Furthermore, the will is faulty only when what the intellect provides is faulty, i.e. when it provides confused ideas. So they are co-extensive, and equally flawed.
"The scope of both faculties is equal, and error arises instead from the fact that the perception of the intellect is faulty and the judgment of the will is faulty. Hence there is no basis for your extending the will beyond the bounds of the intellect, since the will never makes judgments about things which the intellect does not perceive, and it makes faulty judgments only because the intellect has faulty perceptions." (CSM II, p. 219)