In this Administration, the "Realist" philosophy of international relations is firmly entrenched. It is thus absolutely puzzling why we should now be unhappy with the government of Iraq. We have, after all, made a conscious decision for over 20 years - from the Reagan administration, if not earlier, in a policy made explicit then and reiterated in Bush I - that Saddam Hussein, however nasty he may be, serves our purposes.

Under the "Realpolitik" view, the primary purpose of foreign policy is the exercise of power in pursuit of security from direct and indirect military threats. Directly controlling other states for this purpose is clearly hard - colonialism has had its day. Instead, we have cultivated a range of client states to further our "real" interests. Given its nuclear capabilities, and sheer size, we could not directly take on the Soviet Union. But we could "contain" its ability to project power by tying down its forces. Hence rapprochement with "Red" China - even though Mao was a villain far worse than Hussein, or Brezhnev - and the support of the Islamic "fundamentalists" in Afghanistan who later brought the Taliban to power.

Economic interests play a minor role in this world-view. Our senior foreign policy officials have, for example, often had neither much understanding of nor patience for enhancing the gains from trade. But there is one exception: access to natural resources, and above all petroleum. Here Iraq was a convenient ally, because it kept two potential enemies - Iran and Saudi Arabia - from exercising dominance over the Gulf and hence the market for oil. Iraq's Kurds also served as a subtle check on Turkey, an ally in NATO against the Soviet Bloc with which it shared borders.

No one had any illusions about the sort of regime we were helping in Iraq. Its government launched an unprovoked war with Iran, killing one million on each side. It developed weapons of mass destruction, and put them to use with our knowledge and - since we were feeding Iraq intelligence on Iranian troop positions - our outright acquiescence. Kuwait was going too far, but we limited our Gulf War objective to "freeing" the Kuwaiti people, as though the government of Kuwait had any concern with its own citizens. We neither removed Hussein from power, nor did we make a systematic effort to destroy his elite Republican Guards. Indeed, when the "Marsh Arabs," a minority within Iraq, tried to assert their autonomy, we stood aside while Hussein's troops decimated their villages. When push came to shove, we refused to support the opposition to the current Iraqi government, something Iraqis remember well.

What is different now? Iran and Saudi Arabia both remain potential forces in the Persian Gulf and the world market for petroleum, and under a "realist" calculation it remains in our interest to keep Iraq strong to counterbalance them. If weapons of mass destruction were a real concern, then we had a chance to take care of that problem under Bush I, and explicitly decided not to. Of course we made a show of things; we did send in inspectors, using the U.N. as a tool, but since we did not back them with any credible threat, their impact was bound to be limited. In addition, since we allow Iraqi oil sales - and money is fungible - we have not erected obstacles to the maintenance of Iraqi military capabilities. That "weapons of mass destruction" are not a real concern is likewise illustrated in our discovery of an ally in Pakistan, even as that country was testing nuclear weapons while escalating a border conflict with India. We seem to have a strong faith in Pakistani command-and-control capabilities, their ability to keep a copious stock of weapons of mass destruction under wraps and out of unfriendly hands, despite the known sympathies of some in Pakistan's military for the Taliban. In contrast, if there is one demonstrable political fact in Iraq, it is Hussein's ability to keep his military under tight control.

Well, if it is neither a shift in the balance of power, nor in the issue of weapons of mass destruction, then could it be terrorism? That is the implicit assumption, and in the absence of confirmation, the media has assumed that Iraqi-sponsored terrorism is an active threat to the US. However, the official silence is probably well-founded. The Iraqi regime was known at one time, many years ago, to support terrorism (precise definitions of "terrorism" aside). What stands out is the silence about such activities for the past decade. Hussein is very good at holding onto power, at judging the limits to which he may push those around him. Creating problems for Iran - perhaps. Allowing the Kurds freedom to use Iraq as a base for raids on Turkey - fine. That makes the Kurds willing to live with his government, at least for the time being. But supporting terror against the US? - we are the ones who have helped keep him in power, time and again. Hussein is too canny to bite the hand that feeds him.

We are then left with a puzzle: why try to topple Hussein, much less invade Iraq? He is barbaric, but for 20 years he has served our purposes. What has changed?- nothing, or at least nothing in the Persian Gulf. All that can be concluded is that the powers that be in Washington have had a change in heart about the principles under which foreign policy should be conducted.

Now as an economist I have always been uncomfortable with "Realpolitik," as it denigrates, or at best ignores, the sorts of benefits I am trained to emphasize. But we should have no illusions that a foreign policy formulated under a broader conception of our global interests offers easy solutions. Indeed, since such broader conceptions do not draw the world in black and white, maintaining consistency is even harder. Nevertheless, the U.S. clearly has much to gain from showing a greater reticence to aid and abet assorted nasties such as the Taliban, a practice that has rebounded to our detriment time and again. At the same time, and in contrast to the reigning "realist" perspective, under a wider vision of America's interests and role in the world we could justify aiming for a regime change in Iraq.

However, such a policy would require of us a deep and ongoing involvement in domestic Iraqi affairs, political and economic, to see that any successor government is not equally rapacious. We would have to carefully weigh such costs before moving forward. And if in the end we conclude that Saddam Hussein indeed ought to be overthrown, by extension the same logic would lead us to question our support of other countries with corrupt and often literally murderous domestic policies and destabilizing international ones. Examples would include Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and indeed perhaps every country between Turkey and India. That such a vision encounters many grave practical problems hardly needs elaboration. If there were a simple solution, we would not be where we are today. But we must not forget that the reigning Realpolitik has a sorry track record and is hardly less problematic.

To reiterate, Iraq has never been a convenient tool of American foreign policy, but tool it has been, not only under two previous Republican administrations, and also (by omission as much as commission) the most recent Democratic one. To date the latest Republican administration has failed to spell out why Iraq, unpleasant regime that it may be, has ceased to be a valued tool in the furtherance of our international interests. As it stands, if we in fact displace Saddam Hussein from power, then our current policy stance will demand that we put in place someone else in his image. It is much easier simply to leave him be.

Michael Smitka, Professor
Williams School of Commerce, Politics & Economics
Washington and Lee University
Wednesday, October 9, 2002